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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BRENT D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY AND AARON
D. KENNARD, SALT LAKE COUNTY
SHERIFF,

Court Case No. 20010101-SC
Category No. 15

Defendants/Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Defendants/Appellants (hereinafter the "County") submit the following reply brief
in further support of their appeal from the judgment below:
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Young's brief presents a "statement of the issues" which recites his version of the
issues before the court. Young's recitation of the questions before the court fails to
address the legal issues raised in the County's appeal and inaccurately characterizes the
records Young requested. Young's request and the court's order deals with both the
Sheriffs Office investigative files and disciplinary records. The County's brief clearly
sets forth the issues presented for review and now before this court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS REPLY
Young's statement of the facts does not accurately represent his request for records
or the court's order to disclose "the disciplinary records and investigative files of any
sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the conduct
investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate
sexual conduct, both verbal or physical." R. 168-169 Young's request sought more than
completed disciplinary files. R. 50, 92,102. Young requested all internal investigations
and disciplinary records. R. 146.
Young stated that the disciplinary records are necessary because "the County
maintains a policy that any discipline must be consistent to that imposed in similar cases,
must be fair and must be appropriate or proportional to the conduct." Appellee's Brief at
4. Thereafter, Young instructs the court that the Sheriffs discipline must be consistent
and proportionate. Young makes reference to the Sheriffs policy at R. 150.
The Sheriffs discipline policy at R. 150 has been attached as Addendum "A"
hereto for the court's convenience. A reading of the policy establishes that Young is
attempting to minimize several elements within the discipline policy. The policy requires
discipline to be equitable. The policy identifies five criteria that the Deputy Sheriffs
Merit Commission should consider when determining if discipline was equitably
administered. Disciplinary actions should be consistent, fair, timely, appropriate and
progressive. Sheriffs Office Policy and Procedure 2-4-06.01, Addendum A. Each of
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these terms is defined within the policy. This policy is not the same as the policy
referenced by Young in either Lucas1 or Kelly2. The Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission
will be considering "consistency" as defined in the policy but proportionality is not a
factor. The word proportionality is never used. In reviewing the definitions,
proportionality could be considered only to the extent it falls under the definitions of
"consistent" or "appropriate". Unlike the City's policy on discipline cited by Young, the
Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission policy sets out five factors rather than two. The
policy does not indicate that a particular weight should be given to any one criterion. The
policy's stated goal is equitable discipline.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I.
A TIMELY APPEAL IS REQUIRED FOR THE COURT
TO HAVE JURISDICTION. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii).
Young does not dispute that a timely appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2404(2)(b)(ii) is a jurisdictional requirement. Instead, Young indirectly argues that an agency
can enlarge the statutory period by a late response. Young cites no legal authority for this
position but relies solely upon the legislative intent in enacting the statute.
On February 4,2000 and February 23, 2000, Young made two requests for Sheriffs
office records under GRAMA. On March 14,2000, the custodian of records denied Young's
1

Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Comm'n. 949 P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997)

2

Kellv v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm'n. 8 P.3d 1048 (Ut. App. 2000)
3

request for records. On March 28,2000, Young filed an appeal with the chief administrative
officer. The chief administrative officer did not respond within the 5 day period provided in
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-40 l(5)(a)(i). That section requires a response within five business
days after receipt of the notice of appeal. These facts are not disputed by the parties.
Based upon the County's interpretation of the statute, Young had 30 days to appeal
his records request once it was deemed denied. This period began to run five business days
after his appeal to the chief administrative officer, March 28, 2000.
On April 20, 2000, the chief administrative officer responded to the March 28, 2000
appeal. Young filed his appeal 23 days after this late response but 42 days after the request
was deemed denied pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-40l(5)(b). The statutory wording at
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-40l(5)(b) is clear;
"[I]f the chief administrative officer fails to make a determination within the
time period specified in Subsection (5)(a), the failure shall be considered the
equivalent of an order denying the appeal." Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401 (5)(b),
(1995).
As indicated by Young, the rules of statutory construction provide that you first look
to the plain language of the statute to give effect to its meaning and intent. Appellee's brief,
at 8. Although courts generally rely upon the plain language rule of statutory construction,
an equally important rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed as a
whole, with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and with the
overall legislative objective of the statute. Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265,268
(Utah 1995). If the court applies Young's interpretation of Utah Code Ann.§63-24

404(2)(b)(ii), both Utah Code Ann. §63-2-40 l(5)(b) and the subsequent provision of Utah
Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b), subsection (iii) become meaningless.3
Admittedly, the Government Records Management Act is a complex statute. Each
section must be read in light of the entire act to ensure that all provisions are ultimately
complied with and have meaning when the entire act is read.
GRAMA is drafted in a manner that when subsections are quoted in isolation, a
different interpretation is possible. This Court in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853
P.2d 877 (Utah 1993), provided a resolution for those situations when applying the plain
language rule of statutory construction would create an ambiguity or conflict with other
statutory provisions. In Sullivan, the court rejected a literal reading of the statute because it
conflicted with other provisions of the act and with the overall intent and purpose. In
Sullivan, the court relied upon the overall intent and purpose of the statute. This Court was
recently faced with construing unusual language that appeared to be contrary to conventional
statutes of limitations. In resolving the issue presented, the court looked to the overall intent
and purpose of the statute to determine its meaning. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ^ 9,27 P.3d

3

There are several other provisions within GRAMA that are ignored by
Young. Some of these provisions seem to even support his arguments standing alone.
However, when these provisions are read in conjunction with the other provisions of
GRAMA they take on a different interpretation. For instance, Young makes no argument
to the court that the provisions of Subsection (5)(a)(ii) or (5)(c) apply in this case. Yet,
both of these sections extend the time period for the chief administrative officer's
response, thereby effectively providing an extension of the time for petitioning for
judicial review.
5

538.
Using the rules of statutory construction, every effort should be made to interpret Utah
Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(i) using its plain meaning. However, if by applying a plain
meaning to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(i)5 it renders the subsequent subsections
meaningless or creates a conflict among provisions, the court must make an effort to
harmonize the provisions in light of the statutes overall intent and purpose.
The County's interpretation allows the court to harmonize the sections governing
judicial review (Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404) with the sections governing appeals found at
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401. The jurisdictional requirements of §63-2-404 cannot be
separated from the response required upon appeal under §63-2-401.
Using principles of statutory construction and case law defining terms,4 Young's
appeal to the chief administrative officer was deemed denied after 5 business days and his
time for appeal began to run pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii). Therefore,
Young's request for judicial review was untimely and the district court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain Young's request for records.
II.

THE RECORDS REQUESTED BY YOUNG
ARE NOT PUBLIC RECORDS.
Young's request dated February 23, 2001 requested the following records:
(b)

Any records concerning any investigation of any member of the Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Department that concerned an improper use or handling of

4

See County's opening brief at pages 10-11 and page 15.
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a firearm or that concerned any sexually inappropriate behavior, both verbal
or physical. R. 146.
Young argues on appeal that his request seeks "completed disciplinary records" w hich are
classified as public records by definition under Utah Code Ann. §63-2-30 l(2)(o). Appellee's
brief, at 11-12. First, Young's request is more encompassing than completed disciplinary
files. His request includes investigative and disciplinary files whether complete or not. His
request also covers investigative files where the party was exonerated and no adverse action
was taken. In fact, Young argues these files will be the most beneficial because they will
establish an allegation of similar conduct with no action taken. Appellee's brief, at 15.
Clearly, investigative files are not covered under Utah Code Ann. §63-2-30l(2)(o), the
provision Young urges the court to use in finding the records are public. Utah Code Ann.
§63-2-30l(2)(o) is limited to completed disciplinary records.
In this case, Utah Code Ann. §63-2-30l(2)(o) is applicable to the completed and
appealed disciplinary records of sworn officers5. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-30l(2)(o)
specifically indicates that it is not applicable when the record sought is expressly exempt
from disclosure by another state statute. The County has demonstrated that sworn officer's
completed disciplinary records would fall under the category of a public record but for Utah
Code Section § 17-30-19, which expressly restricts access to un-appealed disciplinary records.
Young attempts to side step Utah Code Ann.§17-30-19 in his quest for the un-

5

Young has already received copies of all formal disciplinary action taken
when the discipline taken has been appealed. Young has not received un-appealed
discipline or minor personnel actions such as verbal warnings.
7

appealed disciplinary records of sworn officers. Young argues that since his request is
directed to the Sheriff and not the commission referred to in the statute, he can gain access
to the records. Utah Code Ann.§17-30-19(1) requires the person ordering discipline to file
written charges with the commission and serve the officer. At the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
office all disciplinary actions identified at §17-30-19(1) are taken by the Sheriff. After an
officer is notified of the proposed disciplinary action, the officer may appeal in writing to the
commission. Utah Code Ann.§17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) states:
"(n) In the absence of an appeal, a copy of the charges under
Subsection (1) may not be made public without the consent of the
officer charged."
As a result of Utah Code Ann.§17-30-19(2)(a)(ii), Young was not provided with the
un-appealed disciplinary records of officers. These records are not covered under Utah Code
Ann. §63-2-301 (2)(o) as argued by Young. Instead, they are properly classified by the Sheriff
as "protected documents" pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 63-2-304(9) and Utah Code
Ann.§17-30-19(2)(a)(ii).
In addition to the protected status given un-appealed disciplinary files, Utah Code Ann
§63-2-304(9) allows the Sheriffs office to classify investigative files as "protected"
documents. In fact, no other provision of GRAMA discusses investigative files and no
provision classifies investigative files as public documents.
The district court's findings do not dispute the protected classification. Addendum B,
page 2, ^|3, Appellant's Opening Brief. In fact, the court acknowledged the reasoning behind
the protected status of these documents. Addendum B, page 3, Tf6. In addition, protecting the
8

right to privacy in personal data gathered by a government entity is one of the constitutional
interests specifically recognized by GRAMA. Utah Code Ann.§63-2-102(b). The district
court's decision to affirm the protected status of these documents was sound and should be
affirmed by this court.
III.
THE DISTRICT COURT MUST COMPLY WITH
UTAH CODE ANN. §63-2-202(7)(a-e) BEFORE ORDERING
THE RELEASE OF PROTECTED DOCUMENTS.
Both parties are in agreement that before releasing a document properly classified as
"protected" the court must comply with Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a)-(e). Both parties
are also in agreement that the language found at Utah Code Ann. 63-2-202(7) is not
immediately clear. Young argues that Utah Code Ann.§ 63-2-202(7) must be construed in
light of GRAMA's overall legislative intent and the County argues that this provision should
be read in light of the legislative history and the ordinary meaning attached to the phrase
"jurisdiction over a matter in controversy".
The result is the same, regardless of whether the legislative intent is considered or the
legislative history. Young's citations to the legislative intent are not complete. Utah Code
Ann.§63-2-102 recites the legislative intent. The legislative intent recognizes two
constitutional rights and a public policy interest. The constitutional rights were identified as;
the public's right of access to the information concerning the conduct of the public's business
and the right of privacy in personal data gathered by a governmental entity. Utah Code Ann.
§63-2-102(l)(a-b), 1992. The public policy interest recognized by GRAMA is allowing a
9

government to restrict access to certain records for the public good. Utah Code Ann. §63-2102(2), 1992.
When §63-2-202(7)(a) is interpreted in light of the rights recognized by the
legislature, an interpretation that district courts are limited in their ability to order the release
of protected records unless the district court has jurisdiction over the matter in controversy
is consistent with the legislature acknowledging a public policy interest in allowing the
government to restrict access to certain records for the public good. Once a matter is being
litigated, GRAMA acknowledges the court's ability to determine whether a document is
necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the controversy.
Young argues that the County's interpretation of GRAMA "not only restricts, but
completely precludes access." This is not necessarily true. The County's position is as
follows: When a party petitions the district court for judicial review of a governmental
entities' denial, the district court can review the classification and release any public records.
However, if the entity properly classified the document, the district court is limited in
releasing properly classified documents to situations when a "matter in controversy" is before
the court. The County has consistently maintained that Young's request for judicial review
is premature or not ripe. It is the County's position that Young, like the plaintiffs in Lucas,
Kelly and Tolman6, should proceed before the merit commission. Utah Code Ann. §63-2207(2) specifically authorizes the release of records during an administrative proceeding

Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Ut. App. 1991).
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provided that the administrative body follows the procedure set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 632-202(7)(a-e). Young made his request to the administrative body and at this point in time,
that request has been denied. Young was not without recourse. This section is intended to
require persons seeking records over which there is a matter in controversy to present that
request to the body with current jurisdiction over the controversy. See Utah Code Ann. §632-207(2)(b). The requirement that the court have jurisdiction over the matter in controversy
prevents a party from starting a GRAMA proceeding in order to circumvent the other forum's
powers over the discovery process.
In order to prevent the circumvention and disruption of regular court and
administrative processes, this court should interpret Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) as
requiring the court to have jurisdiction over the matter in controversy prior to issuance of an
order. The district court failed to meet this requirement.
IV.
UNDER SECTION 63-2-202(7)(e) OF GRAMA, COURT-ORDERED
RELEASE OF THE UN-APPEALED DISCIPLINARY RECORDS IS
BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §17-30-19, WHICH PROHIBITS
THEIR BEING MADE PUBLIC WITHOUT THE DISCIPLINED
OFFICER'S CONSENT
When the district court considered Young's request for the un-appealed
disciplinary records, the County informed the court that Utah Code Ann. §17-3019(2)(a)(ii) governed the release of these records and GRAMA requires the district court
to comply with Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a-e) prior to ordering the release of a
protected record. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e) provides in pertinent part
11

as follows;
" (7) A governmental entity shall disclose a record pursuant to the terms of a court
order signed by a judge from a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that: . . .
(e) where access is restricted by a rule, statute, or regulation referred to in
Subsection §63-2-201 (3)(b), the court has authority independent of this chapter to
order disclosure."
Subsection §63-2-20l(3)(b) addresses "records to which access is restricted pursuant to
court rule, another state statute,...." Utah Code Ann.§17-30- 19(2)(a)(ii) is a state statute
that restricts the release of un-appealed disciplinary records.
Since Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7)(e) requires that when another statute restricts
access the court must have authority independent of GRAMA to release the record, the
district court was required to identify its authority to release the un-appealed disciplinary
records of deputies.
The County argued before the district court that Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19
prohibited the release of the un-appealed disciplinary records and the court was without
authority to order their release. R. 95-97; R. 132. No evidence was before the district
court that another statute authorized the release of un-appealed disciplinary records.
Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e), read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann.
§17-30-19(2)(a)(ii), is controlling and prohibits the release of the un-appealed
disciplinary records.
The County requests a reversal of the district court's decision releasing the unappealed disciplinary records because the court's decision to release the records directly
12

conflicts with Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19(2)(a)(ii). A reversal of the decision to release
investigative files is also appropriate because the district court failed to correctly apply
the standards set forth at §63-2-202 (7)(e) when ordering their release.
V.

YOUNG'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
SHOULD BE DENIED.
Young is requesting attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which permits the court to access damages for a frivolous appeal
taken for delay. Young argues that the County's appeal is contrary to the plain language
of the statute. The County's appeal outlines the specific statutory provisions it relies upon
to support its arguments of untimeliness and the district court's failure to follow the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(7). The County acknowledges that there is
limited case law interpreting GRAMA. However, the case law relied upon supports the
County's arguments to reverse the district court's decision in this case and deny Young
access to the requested records.
The County continues to acknowledge its concern over the release of private data.
The County does not believe that redaction solves the problem of releasing private data.
However, the County has additional concerns, such as future classification and release of
investigative files and disciplinary records. The legal issues raised by the County on
appeal are legitimate and worthy of consideration by this court. They are not frivolous.

13

The County respectfully requests the Court deny Young's request for attorney fees
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a).
CONCLUSION
The district court lack jurisdiction to hear Young's untimely request for judicial
review. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) requires the district court to have
jurisdiction over the matter in controversy prior to ordering the release of protected
records. The district court never met the requirement of Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a)
prior to issuing its order.
For the foregoing reasons, the County asks this Court to vacate the summary
judgment awarded Young and either: (a) remand for entry of an order dismissing Young's
petition for judicial review as untimely; or (b) remand for entry of summary judgment in
the County's favor denying Young's GRAMA request for court-ordered disclosure of the
protected record.
DATED this i ^ T day of October, 2001.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney

VALERIE M. WILDE
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM A

2-4-06.00

Disciplinary Actions

2-4-06.01

Equitable Disciplinary Actions
Disciplinary actions, in order to be equitable, should meet the following criteria:

2-4-06.02

(1)

Consistent - Similar disciplinary action should be taken for similar offenses.

(2)

Fair - Disciplinary action requires due process and penalties consistent with the
seriousness of the misconduct,

(3)

Timely - Disciplinary action should be administered within a reasonable time period
after the need for such action is discovered and confirmed.

(4)

Appropriate - Disciplinary action must reflect the seriousness of the misconduct, the
past history of the member in violation, and an appraisal of the options available to
influence the member to change his or her behavior.

(5)

Progressive - Consistent with the intent to create self-discipline, disciplinary actions
should be progressive in nature. The usual sequence of disciplinary actions will be
verbal warning, written warning, suspension and/or demotion, and termination.
Deviations from procedure may be justified depending on the severity' and
circumstances of the action(s) to be disciplined.

Types of Discipline
(1)

Verbal Warning - Verbal censure of a member. A verbal warning will be documented
in writing and copies will be placed in the Division and Sheriffs Office Personnel files.

(2)

Written Warning - Written censure of a member. Copies will be filed in the Division's
and the Sheriffs personnel files on the member. The member may request and receive
a verbal explanationfromthe supervisor issuing the written warning. The member may
also prepare and have included with the written warning a brief written explanation or
rebuttal.

(3)

Suspension - Action which denies a member the authority to perform his or her duties.
In the case of sworn personnel, a suspension acts to take away status as a peace officer
during the period of suspension. Suspension results in loss of pay and benefits.

(4)

Demotion in Rank/Pav - Reduction in rank and/or pay.

(5)

Termination - Termination of the employment of the member.

(6)

For purposes of this chapter, verbal and written warnings are deemed minor discipline
and suspensions, demotions, and termination are deemed major discipline.

Revised 11-12-96

